

## **EXHIBIT 7**

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SHABTAI SCOTT SHATSKY, *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

-against-

THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, *et al.*,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 02-2280 (RJL)

**DECLARATION OF YANIV BERMAN**

I, Yaniv Berman, declare pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1746, as follows:

1. I am a professional translator with an M.A. degree in Middle Eastern Studies from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Israel). I read and understand Arabic and English fluently, and I am capable of translating accurately from Arabic to English.

2. The English-language document attached hereto and marked as Appendix 1 is a full and accurate translation of the complete Arabic-language audio track of the audiovisual recording which is available for viewing (as of July 16, 2017) at:

<https://www.facebook.com/PFLPinformationoffice/videos/1042926575811847/>

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

July 16, 2017

  
Yaniv Berman

## **APPENDIX 1**

Kaabi: ... Some of the comrades were killed. The operation was announced but did not create much of a stir. Other factions tried to claim responsibility for the operation, but it is proven that the comrades were responsible for it.

Interviewer: Yes.

Kaabi: It was the last operation of the Popular Resistance Forces, on the day the martyr Comrade Abu Ali Mustafa was assassinated... two, or three hours after he was assassinated in cowardly fashion by the Zionist occupation forces.

Interviewer: Yes. Comrade Allam, we have mentioned the Popular Resistance Forces – Let's talk about the reason for the outbreak of the Second Intifada – the main reason for the sudden uprising of our people against the enemy, what was it?

Kaabi: I think that the most reasonable explanation is the withdrawal of the Zionist occupation from South Lebanon in '95, which contributed to the morale and to the firm conviction that resistance is capable of liberating a homeland. It was a slap to those who promoted the idea that resistance will be of no use against the Zionist occupation. I also think that the capitulatory solution which the executive leadership in the PLO tried, proved useless and unsuccessful. This is especially true, seeing that between 1993 and 2000, 7 years... two years passed since the agreement in which they talked about, or since the end of the interim solution, which was supposed to last five years and end in 1998, and be followed by serious negotiations, to come up with solutions regarding the state, the capital city, the refugees, and all critical issues pertaining to the basic Palestinian rights. However, Israel as usual, used the Oslo Accords as a cover-up for negotiations for the sake of negotiations. This farce is still going on today, proving that the Zionist occupation

only understands the language of force and the language of resistance. Moreover, Arafat also made an attempt to pressure some parties into starting a time-limited, containable intifada in order to bring about...

Interviewer: A change in the situation?

Kaabi: More of an upheaval than an intifada, in an attempt to achieve two goals: the first was to send a message to the international community and the second was for this upheaval to serve as an outlet for the Palestinian people, who were furious at the corruption of the [Palestinian] Authority, at its policies and practices.

However, the leadership of the [Palestinian] Authority was surprised to find out the Palestinian people was indeed very furious. Its fury was directed at the Zionist occupation for a number of reasons that I have already mentioned: the [Palestinian] Authority practices against the Palestinian people, the Oslo lie, the fruitless negotiations, and the Palestinian belief that we were not less capable than Hezbollah and the Lebanese resistance that liberated South Lebanon from the Zionist occupation.

Interviewer: Comrade Allam, you had a role during the Intifada, at the beginning of the Intifada, at its outbreak, you had a role with the Popular Resistance Forces and also with the Popular Front generally. You mobilized the furious youth to confront the enemy. Please tell us about that role at the beginning of the Intifada.

Kaabi: The good thing about the Popular Front is that it has revolutionary foundations and that its members are willing to give and sacrifice. This is what makes the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine unique – its foundations are

based on giving, sacrifices and confrontation.

It is no secret that due to our abilities, we couldn't recruit the dozens and hundreds of people, who came to us in groups and asked to join the military apparatus of the Popular Front in the West Bank. We couldn't recruit all those people, regardless of all our attempts, because great capabilities were required, great efforts and a huge capacity for taking in the whole human resource consisting of the comrades, who trooped in in order to join the ranks of the military apparatus.

We did our best to make use of all these available resources. We, in the Popular Front, do not wish to concentrate on the military activity only. We have a lot of methods. Using varying methods is very useful in achieving your goals.

We tried to select the best of those comrades and integrate them in that field, those who had experience, and experience in interrogations, or security-related experience. We concentrated on villages because the villages in the West Bank have more contact with the [Jewish] settlements and are nearer to the contact lines, checkpoints and bypass roads, etc.

If you read about the experience of the comrades in the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, you will find that the majority of our comrades are residents of villages adjacent to central cities, which are located near the settlements, bypass roads and military bases of the Zionist army.

This is also a firm conviction of the comrade leader Ahmad Saadat, who believes that the Front becomes stronger in times of difficulty, because the position of our comrades who form the rank and file of the Front is more revolutionary than that of many, who claim to be the spearhead of the revolutionary activity.

Interviewer: By the way, let's send a greeting to our comrade Abu Ghassan [Ahmad Saadat] who is now in the occupation jail. Comrade Allam, the most memorable event that shocked the Palestinian people was the assassination of the martyr leader Abu Ali Mustafa. What made the enemy consider the assassination of leader

Abu Ali Mustafa? I mean, what did this entity [Israel] see in him?

Kaabi: First, we have to understand that the Zionist occupation understood the messages the leader Abu Ali Mustafa had been sending it from the very beginning. I do not rule out the possibility that the Zionist enemy showed leniency and allowed comrade Abu Ali Mustafa into the homeland because the Zionist enemy had already planned the idea that comrade Abu Ali Mustafa would enter, but would leave this place only as a martyr. Abu Ali Mustafa led a resistance project on different levels. As I told you, the Zionist occupation followed and traced every single message by comrade Abu Ali Mustafa, whose priority was to rehabilitate the military activity and the armed resistance against the Zionist occupation.

Moreover, we cannot deny the important political role of the resistance, and the open political battle which comrade Abu Ali Mustafa fought against the ardent advocates of the Oslo Accords and the executive leadership of the PLO.

Shortly before his martyrdom, he sought to – and shortly before the Intifada too – he sought to formulate a national, apolitical resistance program, against the Oslo Accords and their consequences.

We also cannot deny the fact that the Zionist occupation managed to identify that the comrades planted a bomb inside a watermelon on a Zionist bus in Jerusalem. The Zionist intelligence was able to make the connection between that incident and the method used by the Front in Lebanon during the period in which the martyr leader Abu Ali Mustafa led the military activity of the Front outside Palestine. They determined that the person who manufactured the [booby trapped] watermelon was comrade Abu Ali Mustafa. The comrade who was in charge of planting the watermelon on the bus made a mistake. He did not pull the cord of the timer and the watermelon did not explode. Based on that, the Zionist intelligence managed to determine that the person who manufactured the watermelon and filled it with the explosive charge was the martyr comrade Abu Ali Mustafa; particularly since the

Zionist occupation had a bitter recollection of that method, which was used by the Front in Lebanon. They made the connection between the watermelon that was discovered on a bus in Jerusalem and the improvised explosive devices that comrade Abu Ali Mustafa used to make, paying attention to the smallest details.

The Israeli intelligence determined their target because comrade Abu Ali Mustafa was a real threat to the security of the Zionist entity and its eradication plans. Therefore, Israeli intelligence had no choice but to recommend the assassination of the first Palestinian leader to be assassinated during the Second Intifada, thinking that by assassinating comrade Abu Ali Mustafa they would thwart the resistance and the ideas that comrade Abu Ali Mustafa advocated. However, things proved otherwise.

Interviewer: Let's move on to the reaction of the military apparatus to the assassination of the Secretary General. You mentioned earlier that two hours after the assassination of Abu Ali Mustafa a number of comrades assassinated, killed a rabbi. In general, how did the military apparatus and the leaders of the military apparatus of the Popular Front receive the news?

Kaabi: No doubt that Abu Ali Mustafa was cherished for his high human qualities, modesty, love of others as well as his political weight and position within the organization. All these factors combined made his assassination come as a shock to all comrades and to all honest Palestinian people. I personally was asleep when comrade Abu Ali Mustafa was assassinated. My mother, who was in Jordan, called me. She was in a state of shock. She cried and asked me what I was doing. I told her that I had been sleeping, and she told me: "they assassinated your man". I asked her: "Who is our man?" She said: "Turn on the TV and you'll know." When I turned on the TV it was a total shock to find out that comrade Abu Ali Mustafa was already among the martyrs. I will be honest with you, we are human – all honest members



of the Front had thoughts and felt a real danger threatening the body of the Front and its future, because comrade Abu Ali Mustafa was viewed as the pillar of the Front on all levels. We respect all leaders and all comrades in the Front, but there are comrades who are the cornerstone, unrivalled comrades. We are talking about one of the founders of the Popular Front, who had fought a long struggle against the Zionist occupation.

The first reaction was that the comrades gathered and planned an immediate, direct and painful response against the Zionist occupation. As I have mentioned, that operation involved a great, unprecedented risk. The preparation was not done properly because it was a result of the comrades' desire to prove to the Zionist occupation that we were all Abu Ali Mustafa and that the blood of the martyr Abu Ali Mustafa would not go in vain

Interviewer: ... and that resistance would not cease.

Kaabi: The Front would pay back twofold. The first message was the execution of that operation by the Nablus cell. It could have cost the lives of all the members of the cell that executed that mission as a result of the quick reaction. This is a proof of the high spirit and [sic.] of the comrades toward martyrdom, giving and sacrifice. As I mentioned, tomorrow is the anniversary of the martyrdom of the two comrades Jibril and Fadi. Jibril and Fadi were two of the comrades who participated in that operation and refused to be arrested. They confronted the occupation forces until the last bullet and the last drop of blood. They had the chance to surrender without any bloodshed, but they... this proves the high fighting spirit of the comrades in the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades.

Interviewer: How was the military apparatus, the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades,

founded immediately after the assassination of Abu [name unclear]?

Kaabi: As I mentioned, the beginnings were upon the return of Comrade Abu Ali Mustafa. Upon the outbreak of the Second Intifada a group of comrades were put in charge of this apparatus, which was subordinate to a central leadership. They received orders periodically, sent reports of the plans of the operations they intended to carry out and waited for approvals for each attack and for each target they wished to attack. But thanks to its strong structure, the Front was able to found the military apparatus in a short time, especially because the Front was, as I said, made up of experienced, capable, intelligent comrades.

The Front did not face any difficulties because the number of people who wanted to join the military apparatus was huge. This is a proof that the resistance is an option that is always present in the hearts and minds of the comrades on all levels.

A central leadership was formed in each district. These leaderships were subordinate to one, higher leadership. Each leadership was in charge of forming a number of cells in the districts, and they received support to the extent possible, in spite of the modest means. It might be difficult to talk about the details concerning the way we managed to receive funding because it might put some comrades in danger. The greatest efforts were made thanks to comrade Abu Ali Mustafa, who provided the resources-

Interviewer: Let's talk about the Popular Resistance Forces. After the martyrdom of comrade Abu Ali Mustafa, how was the military apparatus of the Front – which was named “the Popular Resistance Forces”, and was renamed the “Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades” - how were the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades prepared to fight the occupation?

Kaabi: It was the same organization and it continued to exist, but out of respect the Front informed all units that from now on the new name would be “the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades.” The responsibility for all the self-sacrifice activities from now on would be claimed using the new name. A new logo was designed, too. This was decided by the central leadership, and not by the districts, where fighters in the field receive orders and carry out missions exactly as required of them.

Interviewer: What were the most significant operations carried out by the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades? We have mentioned the killing of the Zionist rabbi. How did the Popular Front retaliate? We know that the retaliation was harsh – the assassination of Rehavam Ze'evi, the Zionist Minister of Tourism. Tell us about the most significant operations after the assassination.

Kaabi: The most significant operation carried out by the Front was the assassination of Rehavam Ze'evi. The Front, or the military apparatus, did not particularly rely on suicide attacks. I am talking about the West Bank. After the assassination of comrade Abu Ali Mustafa, we seriously considered suicide attacks, but on a small scale and according to specific conditions and restrictions. One of the operations that were carried out after the assassination of Comrade Abu Ali Mustafa – the cells fired at bypass roads, at vehicles of settlers, at settlements, at military posts and bases...

Interviewer: So the door was open to anyone to carry out an operation.

Kaabi: The cells had always direct confrontations with the occupation army and did not rely on suicide attacks. However, after the assassination of comrade Abu Ali Mustafa we considered using suicide attacks in our struggle against the Zionist

occupation. The first suicide attack was carried out in the settlement of Ariel by *istish'hadi* [suicide attacker] Shadi Nassar, a resident of Madama village in Nablus. He was recruited and prepared by Comrade Yamin Faraj. I think that he had been in jail and was a member of the Yamin Faraj cell. A lot of people were killed and injured in that operation, but the occupation chose not to reveal the number of those killed and injured in that operation.

After that, the Karnei Shomron operation was executed by comrade Raed Nazal from Qalqilya in coordination with the comrades in the Brigades in Nablus. It was a joint, distinguished effort. I think it was carried out by *istish'hadi* [suicide attacker] Sadeq Abd al-Hai. Many settlers were killed inside the settlement. After the operation the Israeli army attacked several Front headquarters in Nablus with aircraft and artillery fire.

The Brigades in Nablus was the first organization to carry out a suicide attack within the '48 borders – in Netanya's city market – after Operation Defensive Shield and after Sharon boasted that he had destroyed the resistance and that the resistance would not be heard of anymore, telling the Zionists to enjoy a long, undisturbed sleep.

The now-liberated comrade Duaa al-Jayyousi participated in the operation. I was among the members of the cell. The operation was supposed to be carried out by the martyr comrade, the hero *istish'hadi* Osama Boshkar of Askar camp. We planned to send our comrade to a military bus in front of the Ariel settlement, but after the 2002 invasion the operation could not be carried out. The weather was also not in our favor; it rained heavily, and the comrade was supposed to walk long distances in mountains and valleys. We decided not to carry it out. We delayed it, and then decided after the invasion to attack inside the Zionist depth as a response to the crimes committed by the Zionist occupation state, when it executed its invasion in 2002.

We used a difficult, exhausting strategy. Our targets should be within the '67 borders. The majority of our operations were against settlements and military

bases. We carried out an attack in a base of the special, 202<sup>nd</sup> Paratroopers Brigade which was directly commanded by Mofaz.

The person in charge of the camp was killed. There was a military presence and a large number of troops in Nablus then. It was a joint operation carried out with the brothers in the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. It was a successful operation that led to the withdrawal of all military bases near the city of Nablus and on its borders. It was a qualitative operation.

Interviewer: Were those the most significant operations carried out...

Kaabi: There were other operations...

Interviewer: We would like to discuss them after a short break. A short break and we will be back.

**EXHIBIT 7A**  
**VIDEO FILE**